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Abstract 
This study assesses targeting efficiency and effectiveness of the two most 
important welfare programs in Egypt,  the food subsidy program and the Social 
Assistance Program. The study uses two sources for data: field data for seven 
governorates in Egypt with the highest poverty ratio, and published data. It finds that 
the food subsidy program is fairly inefficient in targeting the lower income groups, 
especially in rural areas. Also, it is not well targeted on the governorates’ level. Upper 
Egypt governorates with the highest poverty ratios take less food subsidy, as compared 
to urban governorates with the lowest poverty levels. The study finds, also, that the 
Social Assistance Program is insufficient to cover the minimum cost of living for the 
lowest income groups in Egypt, and it is not well targeted on the governorates’ level, 
given their relative poverty levels. Finally, assessing the impact of in-kind subsidy vis-
à-vis cash subsidy on poverty in Egypt, it has been found that in-kind subsidy is 
preferable to cash subsidy, since with the high inflation rate in the country, the former 
provides the poor with a set amount of necessary food commodities, while the 
purchasing power of cash transfers will deteriorate with the rise in prices. However, 
the distribution system of the in-kind subsidy has to be structurally revised to well-
target the poor and the low-income people in Egypt. 
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Food Subsidy and Social Assistance Program in Egypt; 
Targeting and Efficiency Assessment 
By 
Karima Korayem
1
 
I- Introduction: 
 Poverty is, on average, 25 percent on the country level according to 
official statistics, and reaches 66 percent in the South (Upper Egypt) in 
2010/11. Among the important policies that the Government of Egypt (GOE) 
applies to combat poverty are the food subsidy system and the social assistance 
program.  
 The objective of this study is twofold: first, to assess the impact of these 
two social policies on the poor with respect to targeting and efficiency in 
reducing their cost of living, and second, examining the pros and cons of 
substituting cash food subsidy instead of the current in-kind food subsidy 
system in Egypt, which is a big ongoing debate among international 
organizations and policy makers.     
Two data sources have been used in the assessment: field work data and 
published data. Field work has been conducted in seven Egyptian governorates 
in the period October - November 2009
2
. Those governorates have been chosen 
according to two criteria: First, the different geographic locations in the 
country, represented by Urban governorates, Lower-Egypt governorates, and 
Upper-Egypt governorates, and second, the relatively high poverty ratio. 
According to these criteria, the seven chosen governorates are: Menya, Assiut 
and Sohag in Upper-Egypt, Sharkia and Kafr-El-Sheikh in Lower Egypt, Mersa 
Matrouh for remote Border governorates and Cairo for Urban governorates
3
.  
The study consists of four parts, including the Introduction which forms part 
one. Part two describes the structure and the evolution of the food subsidy 
system in Egypt, and its assessment. Part three discusses the Social Assistance 
Program (SAP) with respect to its structure and development over the last ten 
years, and its assessment. The fourth part is on the pros and cons for 
                                                 
1
 Professor of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Al-Azhar University; email: nile@link.net 
2
 There are 27 Governorates in Egypt. 
3
 Cairo may not have a higher poverty ratio as compared to other Urban governorates but, as the capital 
of the country, we thought that it has to be included to find out its relative position in the subsidy issues 
discussed.   
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substituting cash subsidy for the current in-kind food subsidy in Egypt, given 
the characteristics of the economy.  
 
II- Food Subsidy in Egypt
4
: 
The food subsidy targets the poor and the low-income population.  The food 
subsidy system in Egypt includes two main subsystems: (1) ration card (RC) that 
offers eligible households specific quotas of subsidized commodities (sugar, oil, rice, 
and tea); and (2) Baladi Bread (BB)
5
, which is distributed through the market outlets 
with no distinction among the buyers (first come, first serve). 
1- Structure and Evolution of the Food Subsidy: 
The history of the subsidy system in Egypt dates back to the mid 1940's when the 
first program was initiated after World War II to provide everyone (not just target 
groups) with necessities such as sugar, kerosene, coarse cotton textiles, edible oil, and 
tea. Since then, the food subsidy system has gone through several phases during which 
significant changes have been undertaken. The last three decades have witnessed 
several reform initiatives to better target poor and low-income people and to improve 
the efficiency of the system. However, it is still widely believed that the current food 
subsidy system is inefficient and needs further reforms.  
  Throughout Nasser’s years, allocations for food subsidies were modest since 
prices were already controlled by the government, and the ration-card (RC) system 
was mainly aimed to protect all Egyptians from commodity shortages. Food subsidies 
grew significantly in scope and cost under President Sadat
6
, when price controls 
became less effective. Gradually, more commodities were introduced to the subsidy 
system until it reached 18 items. Following the recommendation of the IMF and the 
WB, the Government of Egypt (GoE) announced in January 1977 a drastic reduction 
in the food subsidy, including the Baladi Bread (BB) subsidy. The result was the 
break-out of massive popular riots, which made the government back down on these 
measures. By 1980/81, total expenditures on food subsidies jumped to almost 14 
                                                 
4 Unless otherwise stated, this part draws from: Al-Araby (2010). 
5
 BB is a local type of bread widely used by the Egyptians. 
 
6
 Sadat took power in 1970. 
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percent of total government expenditure (L.E. 1.4 billion) compared to only 0.2 
percent (LE 3 million) in 1970/71.  
When President Mubarak took office in 1981, he adopted a gradual reform strategy 
of slow transformations in the subsidy system to reduce its amount, while avoiding 
political unrest, like the one that took place in 1977. Several measures were taken in 
this respect in 1981 and 1989 regarding the RC system. These include the reduction of 
the number of commodities covered by the RC and the reduction in the number of the 
RC holders. 
For BB, which is heavily subsidized, several policy measures were taken to reduce 
its subsidy burden. Those measures include introducing a better quality BB with the 
increase in its price from 1-piaster a loaf to 2-piasters, and then to 5-Piasters, which is 
the current price of BB. The subsidy-reduction measures include, also, the reduction of 
the 5-piasters BB loaf in weight and size, and using wheat-maize flour mix in its 
production. All along BB quality kept deteriorating. The result of these RC and BB 
measures has been a significant decline in food subsidy expenditure from almost 14 
percent of total government expenditures in 1980/81 to 5.6 percent in 1996/97. (WFP, 
2008, and Ahmed et al., 2001, as cited in El-Araby, 2010). From this time on, the food 
subsidy in Egypt has been fluctuating around this figure, depending mainly on 
international crises (like the food crisis in 2007 and the financial crisis in 2008), and 
on domestic policies (like lifting the hold on adding the new-born children to the RC 
system that stayed 19 years, from 1989 to 2008). The food subsidy reached 6.1% of 
total government expenditure in 2008/09. The BB subsidy has had always the largest 
share in food subsidy in Egypt.   
 
2- Assessment of the Food Subsidy: 
The RC and the BB subsidy systems will be assessed from a targeting perspective 
with respect to the efficiency of allocating the subsidy to the necessary consumer 
goods of low-income people (the target group), and the efficiency of the distribution 
mechanism of the BB and the RC commodities to this target group. Three criteria will 
be applied in this respect: (a) the necessity of the BB and the RC commodities as 
consumer goods; (b) the importance of the BB and the RC commodities in the budget 
of the poor and the low-income (expenditure) people; (c) the efficiency of the 
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distribution mechanism of the BB and the RC commodities in reaching the target 
group (poor and the low-income households). 
 
Targeting Assessment of the BB and the RC Commodities: 
To assess the efficiency of the BB and the ration-card system from a “targeting 
perspective”, three questions will be addressed: How necessary are the subsidized 
commodities as consumer goods? How important are the subsidized commodities to 
the target group, the poor and the low-income people in Egypt? How efficient is the 
operation of the system in reaching the poor and the low-income people in Egypt? 
Households Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey (HIECS) (2004/05) data 
will be used in answering those questions
7
. 
To answer the first question, the expenditure and price elasticities of the five 
subsidized items (BB, rice, edible oil, sugar, and tea) have been estimated using the 
2004/05 HIECS data and the following demand function:
8
 
Log  = a + b log   (1) 
Where  refers to the weighted average expenditure of the household on the i
th
 
commodity in the j
th
 expenditure interval;  refers to total weighted expenditure 
per household in the j
th
 expenditure interval. The weights used are the percentage 
of households in the different expenditure brackets
9
. 
 
Table (1) 
 Expenditure Elasticities 2004-05 
 
 Baladi Bread Edible oil Sugar Rice Tea 
Urban  0.852 0.795 0.793 0.783 0.773 
Rural  0.443 0.663 0.649 0.801 0.538 
Source: Estimated using equation (1) and the data shown in Tables 1.B-1 & 1.B-2 in Annex 1.B; see 
Al-Araby (2010).  
                                                 
7
 Those are the unpublished data of the HIECS, which were provided by the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 
8
Five different forms of the demand function were tried following Korayem (2000), but the log-log was 
chosen based on the goodness-of-fit criteria (Al-Araby, 2010). For more details, see Annex 1.A. 
9 The weights are shown in Tables 1.B-1 and 1.B-2 in Annex 1.B.  
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As table (1) shows, the expenditure elasticities of all subsidized items in both 
urban and rural areas are positive and less than one, indicating that these items are 
necessary normal goods.  
To estimate the price elasticities of the five commodities, the following 
formula has been used:
10
  
  (2) 
Where PEi is the price elasticity of the i
th
 commodity, taking into account only 
the expenditure effect of a price change; Ki is the average propensity to spend on 
the i
th
 commodity; EEi is the expenditure (or income) elasticity of the i
th
 
commodity. 
      Tables (1.B-3) and (1.B-4) in Annex 1.B include the estimated price elasticities of 
the five subsidized commodities in both urban and rural areas in the different 
expenditure brackets. As shown in these tables, the price elasticities of all commodities 
are quite small, indicating that these commodities are necessary goods for both urban 
and rural consumers. As expected, the absolute values of price elasticities for the five 
commodities are slightly higher for lower-expenditure groups because, even with the 
price increase of those basic commodities, they have to buy a certain quantity of them 
to satisfy their family needs. This is expected to be at the expense of lowering their 
consumption of other goods and services, given their small budget.  
To assess the importance of subsidized commodities to the poor and the lower-
income people in Egypt, the average household expenditure on the subsidized food 
commodities as a percentage of total food expenditure has been calculated for the 
different expenditure brackets, using the 2004/05 HIECS data. The higher the relative 
share of the household budget spent on these commodities in the low expenditure 
brackets, the more the poor and low–income people in general are benefiting from the 
food subsidy. As shown in Tables (1.B-5) and (1.B-6) in Annex 1.B, urban and rural 
households in the lower expenditure brackets allocate larger proportion of their total 
food expenditures to the five subsidized food items as compared to those in the higher 
brackets. For urban households, the average ratio of expenditure on the five subsidized 
                                                 
10
 Since the substitution effect cannot be separated from other factors, this formula takes into 
consideration income effect only, assuming that the substitution effect is zero. For more details on the 
foundation of this formula, see Korayem (2000). 
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food commodities to total food expenditure in the three lowest expenditure brackets –
less than LE 4000 a year – are 7.6 %, as compared to a ratio of 0.47% in the highest 
two expenditure brackets, LE 75000 and more
11
. In the rural sector, households’ ratio 
of expenditure on the BB and the four RC subsidized food commodities to total food 
expenditure in the three lowest expenditure brackets (less than LE 4000 a year) is 
7.25%, as compared to a ratio of 1.2% for the rural households in the two highest 
expenditure brackets, LE 50000 and more
12
. This confirms that subsidized food items 
are more important in the budgets of lower-expenditure households as compared to 
those with higher expenditure. Figures (1) and (2) show these results.    
 An important criterion for evaluating the efficiency of the subsidy system is 
whether this system caters to the right target group or not. To answer this question, we 
shall examine the distribution of the five subsidized commodities to low-, middle-, and 
high- income (expenditure) households in the urban and rural sectors and, also, the 
distribution of the RCs, the number of the RC beneficiaries, the wheat flour quota 
distributed to the poor, and the BB bakeries on the governorate and regional levels, 
given the state of poverty in the governorates. 
 
 
Figure (1) 
Average Household Expenditure on Baladi Bread as (%) of Total Food & Beverage 
Consumption in Urban and Rural Sectors 
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Source: Derived from Tables 1.B-5 & 1.B-6 in Annex 1.B.  
                                                 
11
 Calculated from Table 1.B-5 in Annex 1.B as the summation of the expenditure ratios of the five 
commodities in each of the three lowest expenditure brackets, divided by 3 (=(7.43 + 7.38 + 8.04) / 3), 
to get the average expenditure ratio for the three lowest expenditure brackets. For the highest two 
expenditure brackets, the average expenditure ratio for the five subsidized commodities is calculated as: 
(0.67 + 0.26)/2.  
12
 Calculated from Table 1.B-6 in Annex 1.B by the same way as in the urban sector (see footnote 
above). 
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Figure (2) 
 Average Household Expenditure on Ration-Card Items  as (%) of Total Food & 
Beverage Consumption (%)  
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(b) Rural 
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Table (2) 
The Deciles' Distribution of Household Total Expenditure in Urban and Rural 
Sectors in Egypt, 2004/05 
 
Household Distribution 
Deciles 
Relative Expenditure Share 
(Urban) 
Relative Expenditure Share 
(Rural) 
I 3.3 4.3 
II 4.8 5.7 
III 5.9 6.9 
IV 6.7 7.9 
V 7.7 8.8 
VI 8.6 9.7 
VII 9.9 11.0 
VIII 11.6 12.2 
IX 14.7 14.2 
X 26.9 19.8 
Source: Calculated from Tables 1.B-1 &1.B-2 in Annex 1.B; see Al-Araby (2010), Table 3. 
 
 To examine the distribution of the BB and the RC commodities to the low-, 
middle-, and high-income (expenditure) households,  the decile distribution of 
households total expenditure in urban and rural sectors in Egypt in 2004-2005 is 
estimated first (Table 2), then the three income (expenditure) household groups are 
defined next. The differentiation between low-, middle-, and high-income  
 (expenditure) groups is based on the equal-income distribution share as the 
measurement norm
13
,  specifying the middle-income (expenditure) households as those 
falling around the equal-income (expenditure) distribution share, which is 10% of 
national income (total households’ expenditure) for the decile distribution. 
Accordingly, the low-income (expenditure) group is defined as the household’s decile 
whose relative share in national income (total expenditure) is less than 8% for each 
decile; the middle-income (expenditure) group is those household’s deciles whose 
relative share in national income (total expenditure) ranges between 8% and 12% of 
national income (total expenditure) for each decile; and the high-income (expenditure) 
group includes the household deciles whose relative share in national income (total 
                                                 
13
 Based on the equal-income distribution concept, income is equally distributed among the population 
if a given percentage of the population receives an equal percentage of national income. 
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expenditure) is 12% and more for each decile
14
.  Applying this definition to the decile 
distribution in Table 2, one finds that the low-expenditure group includes 50% of 
households in urban sector and 40% in rural sector, the middle-expenditure group 
includes 30% of the households in both urban and rural sectors, and the high-
expenditure group consists of 20% of households in the urban sector and 30% in the 
rural sector.  
 Looking at the distribution of the subsidized commodities to the three 
household groups in both sectors in 2004 / 05, one finds that in the urban sector (Table 
3), 46.4% of BB is allocated to the low-expenditure households group, 34.5% to the 
middle-expenditure group and 19.2% to the high-expenditure group. This means that 
81% of the BB is allocated to the low- and middle-expenditure urban households (the 
target group) in Egypt, which implies that the BB subsidy waste is around 19% in the 
urban sector. For the RC commodities, around 45% of each of the subsidized 
commodities (edible oil, sugar, rice and tea) is distributed to the low-expenditure 
households’ group, around 35% to the middle-expenditure group, and around 19 % to 
the high-expenditure group. This implies that about 80% of the RC subsidy is directed 
to the target group (low- and middle-expenditure households) in the urban sector and, 
hence, subsidy waste is about 20%.  
 
On the other hand, in the rural sector, targeting of the subsidized commodities 
is considerably inefficient. As shown in Table 4, 33% of BB is distributed to the low-
expenditure rural households’ group as compared to 31% to the middle- and 36% to 
the high-expenditure households’ group. The same targeting inefficiency applies to the 
four RC commodities. Around 27% of each of the RC commodities is allocated to the 
low-expenditure rural households’ group, around 31% of each commodity is allocated 
to the middle-expenditure group, and around 41% is allocated to the high-expenditure 
group. This means that only about 64% of BB and 58% of the RC commodities are 
allocated to the low- and middle-expenditure households in the rural sector, implying a 
subsidy waste of about 1/3 for BB (36%) and 42% for the RC commodities. One may 
conclude that the subsidized commodities are relatively efficiently distributed in the 
urban sector as compared to the rural sector, where relatively large shares of BB and 
RC subsidies are allocated to the rich households. 
 
                                                 
14
 For more details on the methodology, see Korayem (2002). 
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Table (3) 
Decile Distribution of Households Expenditures on the Subsidized Commodities  
In the Urban Sector in Egypt, 2004-2005 
 
Household 
Distribution 
Deciles 
Bread Edible oil Sugar Rice Tea 
I 
6.45 6.66 7.12 6.93 7.50 
II 
8.73 8.03 8.38 8.12 8.46 
III 
9.97 9.45 9.47 9.25 9.79 
IV 
10.34 9.90 10.00 9.77 10.08 
V 
10.90 10.72 10.73 10.62 10.83 
Low Exp. 
Group 
46.39 44.76 45.70 44.70 46.67 
VI 
11.32 11.06 11.12 11.13 11.39 
VII 
11.43 11.88 11.89 12.08 12.02 
VIII 
11.72 12.74 12.32 12.49 12.47 
Medium Exp. 
Group 
34.46 35.68 35.33 35.71 35.89 
IX 
11.27 11.63 11.38 11.67 10.84 
X 
7.89 7.81 7.33 7.75 6.84 
High Exp. 
Group 
19.16 19.44 18.71 19.42 17.68 
Source: Calculated from Tables 1.B-1 & 1.B-2 in Annex 1.B, defining the low-, middle-, and high-
income (expenditure) household groups as included in the text (Al-Araby, 2010). 
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Table (4) 
Decile Distribution of Households Expenditures on the Subsidized Commodities 
In the Rural Sector in Egypt, 2004-2005 
 
Household 
Distribution Deciles 
Bread Edible oil Sugar Rice Tea 
I 
6.12 4.91 5.50 5.34 5.65 
II 
8.22 6.08 6.61 6.34 6.65 
III 
9.17 7.07 7.44 7.24 7.50 
IV 
9.65 8.21 8.40 8.13 8.42 
Low Exp. Group 
33.16 26.27 27.97 27.04 28.22 
V 
9.93 9.21 9.29 9.08 9.33 
VI 
10.17 10.26 10.20 10.17 10.29 
VII 
10.71 11.66 11.51 11.37 11.38 
Medium Exp. Group 
30.81 31.13 30.99 30.62 31.00 
VIII 
11.15 12.78 12.58 12.42 12.27 
IX 
11.55 14.25 13.58 14.19 13.56 
X 
13.32 15.71 14.95 15.82 14.85 
High Exp. Group 
36.01 42.74 41.10 42.44 40.67 
  Source: Calculated from Tables 1.B-1 & 1.B-2 in Annex 1.B, defining the low-, middle-, and high-
income (expenditure) household groups as included in the text  (Al- Araby, 2010). 
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Looking at the governorate and regional levels, the RCs, the RC beneficiaries, 
the wheat flour (82% extraction), and the BB bakeries are unequally distributed, given 
relative poverty in both levels. As shown in Table 5, Upper Egypt whose share of total 
poor is 61 percent has only 30 percent of total BB bakeries and receives 36 percent of 
total wheat flour (82 percent extraction) distributed across the country. Moreover, this 
region gets about 31 percent of total number of RC’s and 34% of the RC beneficiaries. 
On the other side, urban governorates, whose  poor residents represent only 5 percent 
of the total poor, have 16 percent of total RC’s and 15 percent of RC beneficiaries, 
21% share of wheat flour (82% extraction) and 22% of the BB bakeries. Nonetheless, 
Lower Egypt where almost one third of the total poor live, has 47 percent of the total 
RC holders, 44 percent of total beneficiaries, 40 percent of BB outlets, and 35% of 
wheat flour (82 percent-extraction)
15
. 
 To shed more light on the differences between the governorates, given their 
poverty ratios, the shares of the RC, the beneficiaries, the BB Bakeries, and the wheat 
flour (82% extraction) have been calculated per 1% of the poor in the Urban, Lower- 
and Upper-Egypt Governorates. As shown in Table (5), the allocation in 2008 per 1% 
of the poor is 3 RC in the Urban Governorates, as compared to 1.5 RC in Lower-Egypt 
and 0.5 RC in Upper-Egypt Governorates. The distribution of the number of 
Beneficiaries is 3, 1.4 and 0.6 in the three governorate groups respectively. For the  
number of the BB Bakeries, the distribution is 4, 1.3 and 0.5 to the three governorate 
groups respectively; and for the 82% extracted Wheat Flour, the distribution is 4 tons, 
1.1 tons and 0.6 tons. This shows clearly that the Urban Governorates, with the lowest 
poverty ratio, get the largest share of the RC, Beneficiaries, BB Bakeries and Wheat 
Flour (82% extraction) and the Upper-Egypt Governorates, with the highest poverty 
ratio, get the smallest share of them. 
 
                                                 
15
 Urban governorates include: Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Sues. Lower Egypt includes: 
Kalyoubia, Ismailia, Beheira, Gharbia, Dakahlia, Sharkia, Kafr El-Sheikh, Damietta, and Menoufia. 
Upper Egypt includes: Giza, Beni Suef, Fayoum, Assiut, Suhag, Qena, Menia, Aswan, and Luxor.  
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Table (5) 
Regional Distribution of Population, Poor, Ration Cards, Beneficiaries, BB Bakeries, 
and Wheat Flour (82 percent Extraction) in 2008 (%) 
 
Urban 
Governorates  
Lower Egypt 
Governorates  
Upper Egypt 
Governorates 
I- Percentage on the regional 
level 
   
1-Population  16.44        42.99                32.90 
2- Poverty Ratio (2004/05) 5.12 31.57 61.21 
3- Ration Cards 15.58 47.41 30.91 
4- Beneficiaries 15.16 44.46 34.32 
5- BB Bakeries 22.29 40.31 30.34 
6- 82% Extracted Wheat Flour 20.75 35.14 35.99 
II. Distribution per 1% of the 
poor (2008): 
   
7- Number of Ration Cards 3 1.5 0.5 
8- Number of Beneficiaries  3 1.4 0.6 
9- Number of BB Bakeries 4 1.3 0.5 
10- 82% Extracted Wheat Flour 
(ton) 
4 1.1 0.6 
Source: Lines 1-5 are extracted from Table 1.B.8 in Appendix B; and lines 6-9 are estimated by 
dividing, the ration cards ( line 2), beneficiaries ( line 3), BB bakeries (line 4)  and 82% extracted wheat 
flour ( line 5) by the poverty ratio ( line 1).  
   
III- Social Assistance Program (SAP) in Egypt: 
The SAP includes Monthly Assistance Plan, and One-Time Assistance Plan. 
Each of the two Assistance Plans includes different types of SA. The objective of all 
these programs is to provide financial assistance to needy households who are not 
covered by other insurance plans. 
1- Overview of the Social Assistance Program: 
The Government of Egypt (GoE) has broadened the scope of  the Social 
Assistance Program (SAP) over the last ten years with respect to the number of 
recipients, the amount of Social Assistance (SA) and the components of the Program. 
The first law on Social Assistance Programs issued in Egypt was Law 116 in 1950 
(MISA, 1997). Over the last 10 years, the number of SA beneficiaries increased from 
almost 74 thousand in 1998/99 to 1.2 million in 2008/09 (see Table 6), and has been  
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Table 6 
 
 Monthly Social Assistance Programs 1999, 2008, 2009 
 
Source: Columns 1 & 2 are taken from Korayem (2002); and columns 4, 6, 7, 9 are taken from Ministry of Social 
Solidarity, unpublished data; Columns 5 & 8 are calculated from the Table data. 
 
increased to 2 million in the new Social Assistance Law which has been approved by 
the Parliament in 2010. The average monthly amount of SA increased from LE 22 in 
1998/99
16
 to LE 83.3 in 2008/09
17
 (Table 6); i.e., it increased to about four times over 
the last 10-year period. 
Regarding the types of Social Assistance, additional programs have been added 
to the Monthly-Assistance and the One-Time Assistance Plans. The Monthly-
Assistance in 1998/99 covered the Pension Plan (MAASH-EL-DAMAN)
18
 and the 
                                                 
16
 In 1998-99, the average amount of the Pension Plan was LE 30, and the average amount of the 
Monthly Assistance Plan was LE 14 (see Table 6).  
17
 This includes a new Pension Plan, the Child Pension Plan, which was not existent in 1998/99 (see 
Table 6). 
18
 The Pension Plan provided monthly payments to orphans, widows, elderly people, divorced women, 
the handicapped (totally disabled), prisoners’ families (where the sentence is three years and more in 
prison) and unmarried women aged fifty and older. 
Types of 
Social  
Assistance 
1998/99 2007/08 2008/09 
No. of   
Recipients 
 
 
 
(1) 
Ave.  
Month. 
Assist. 
(LE) 
 
(2) 
Total 
Annual 
Assist. 
(LE 
Thous.) 
(3) 
 
No. of   
Recipients 
 
 
 
(4) 
Ave.  
Month. 
Assist. 
(LE) 
(6/4)/12 
 
(5) 
Total 
Annual 
Assist. 
(LE 
Thous.) 
(6) 
No. of   
Recipients 
 
 
 
(7) 
Ave.  
Month. 
Assist. 
(LE) 
(9/7)/12 
(8) 
Total 
Annual 
Assist. 
(LE 
Thous.) 
(9) 
I. Monthly 
Social 
Assistance: 
         
1. Pension 
Plan 
-- 30 -- 915285 76.1 835370.7 1038364 86.2 1073525.9 
2. Monthly Assist. 
Plan 
-- 14 -- 101947 39.0 47746.4 98164 69.3 81598.0 
3. Child Pens. 
Plan 
-- -- -- 49807 38.8 23162.2 49918 52.0 31174.8 
   Total 73995 22.0  1067039 70.8 906279.3 1186446 83.3 1186298.7 
II-Scholarships 
to Students of: 
         
4. Pension Plan -- -- -- 5059852 22.9 139117.3 532410 25.4 162020.0 
5. Monthly Assist. 
Plan 
-- -- -- 44765 19.9 10671.1 54773 25.0 16435.2 
6. Child Pens. 
Plan 
-- -- -- 35062 22.4 9410.5 37713 24.8 11199.3 
   Total    5858122 22.7 159198.9 624896 25.3 189655.0 
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Monthly-Assistance Plan
19
. The One-Time Assistance includes several types; some of 
them were existent in 1998/99, and still exist until today, and others have been added 
in the years 2000’s20.  
 
2-Assessment of the Social Assistance Program (SAP): 
The SAP targets the poor in Egypt. SA will be assessed via three aspects using two 
sources of data: published figures and field work data. These three aspects are: 
sufficiency, coverage, and targeting. 
 A- SA Sufficiency Assessment: In assessing the sufficiency of the SAP in 
meeting the cost of living of the recipients, our indicator here is the annual per capita 
extreme poverty line and the annual per capita total poverty line for Egypt, estimated 
by the World Bank in 2008, which are LE 1462 and LE 1968 respectively 
(Government of Egypt, FAO & others, 2009a; 22). Comparing the average annual 
Social Assistance per recipient in 2008/2009, which is LE 999.6
21
, with the two per 
capita poverty lines; one finds that it represents 68.4% of the extreme poverty line and 
50.8% of the total poverty line, respectively. However, the SA recipient is supporting a 
household in most of the cases. Assuming an average household’s size of five22, the 
annual SA per capita will be LE 200
23
. Comparing this annual SA per capita with the 
two estimated poverty lines, one finds that it reaches only 13.7% of the extreme 
poverty line, and 10.2% of the total poverty line.  
This non-sufficiency of the SA to satisfy the minimum cost of living of the 
poor can be also shown by comparing the average annual SA in 2008/9, which is equal 
to LE 999.6, with the average expenditure on food and beverages, and on total 
consumption of the lowest household’s expenditure bracket (less than LE 2000 a year) 
in the Households Income and Expenditure Consumer Survey (HIECS) 2008/09, 
which are LE 1065.8 and LE 1549.0 respectively (CAPMAS, HIECS 2008/09). 
                                                 
19
 The Monthly-Assistance Plan provides monthly payments to needy individuals and households who 
are not covered by the Pension Plan. Those eligible include pregnant women (until delivery),  infant (up 
to two years of age), the partially disabled, the sick, prisoners families (the sentence should not be less 
than 2 months and below three years in prison) and women deserted by their husbands. 
20
 The first group of one-time assistance payments includes the One-Time Assistance Plan, the Disaster 
Relief Assistance Plan and the Assistance Plan for former Government and Public Sector Employees 
(Korayem, 2002). 
21
 Estimated as average monthly assistance (= LE 83.3 (Table 6)) x 12 months= LE 999.6 
22The average household’s size of the SA recipients in the sample of the field work conducted for the 
study is 5.1. 
23
 The average annual household’s SA (LE 999.9) / average household’s size (5) = LE 199.9 
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According to these figures, the SA coverage will be 93.8% of the food expenditure and 
64.6% of total expenditure of the lowest expenditure bracket.  
 
B- SA Coverage Assessment: To assess the extent of the coverage of the SA to the 
poor on the country level, the ratio of the number of the SA recipients to the number of 
the extreme poor (who are living at the extreme poverty line or below) and to the 
number of the poor (those living at the total poverty line and below) will be estimated. 
Having total population equal to 75.4 million in 2008 (WFP, 2008; Table 2; 10), and 
having the percentage of the extreme poor and the poor in Egypt estimated as 9.1% 
and 35.7%, respectively, in 2008 (GoE, FAO and others, 2009a; 23), the number of the 
extreme poor and poor individuals in Egypt will be 6.9 million and 26.9 million 
individuals respectively, which means 1.4 million extreme poor households and 5.4 
million poor households, according to the average household size of 5 members. 
Having the number of the monthly SA recipients in 2008/09 equal to 1.2 million 
(Table 6), the relative coverage of the SA to the poor households and individuals on 
the country level will be 85.7% of the extreme poor households and 22.2% of all poor 
households
24
. 
 
C- SA Targeting Assessment: Targeting assessment does not intend to determine 
whether or not all the eligible individuals in Egypt get SA. This cannot be done, given 
the current available data in Egypt. In our assessment, successful targeting means 
consistency between SA distribution and poverty. This will be examined on the 
governorate level with respect to the seven governorates covered by the field work 
study. Published data will be used to compare the distribution of the SA recipients in 
these seven governorates with the poverty rate in those governorates. Table 1.C-1 in 
Annex 1.C shows the percentage of the poor in the total population in each of the 
seven governorates, and the ratio of the SA recipients to the poor at the governorate 
level. Ranking those governorates according to the poverty ratio, Assiut comes first, 
with 60.2 % of the population being poor, then comes Sohag with 41.4% poverty ratio, 
Minya (38.3%), Sharkia (26.9%), Kafr-El-Sheikh (13.0) and lastly comes Cairo 
(5.3%). No data are available on the poverty ratio in Mersa-Matrouh.  
                                                 
24
 SA recipients (1.2 million) / extreme poor households (1.4 million) = 85.7%; and SA recipients (1.2 
million) / poor households (5.4 million) = 22.2%. 
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Comparing the percentage of the SA recipients to the poor in the seven 
Governorates in 2008/09 as shown in Table 1.C-1, Annex 1.C, one finds that the 
highest SA coverage, as indicated by this ratio, is in Cairo which has the lowest 
poverty ratio (5.3%). The coverage ratios of the poor by types of SA in Cairo in 
2008/09 are: 21.2% for the Pension Plan, 1.4% for the Monthly-Assistance and 1.7% 
for the Child Pension. The least coverage of SA is in Assiut with the highest poverty 
ratio (60.2 %); next comes Sohag with the second highest poverty ratio among the 
seven Governorates (41.4%). The coverage ratio of the poor by different types of SA 
in Assiut and Sohag in 2008/09 are respectively, 2.9% and 3.3% for the Pension Plan, 
0.2% and 0.4% for the Monthly-Assistance, and 0.1% and 0.05% for the Child Pension 
(Table 1.C-1, Annex 1.C).  
Thus, the SA coverage of the poor in the seven governorates are not well 
targeted since, generally speaking, the SA coverage is greater in the governorates with 
lower poverty ratio (like Cairo) and smaller in the governorates with higher poverty 
ratio (like Assiut). However, one may say that the average amount of the SA are 
fairly targeted, since relatively higher amount of SA are allocated to the poorer 
Governorates, and relatively lower amount to the less poor ones.  
 
IV- Cash Subsidy and In-Kind Subsidy; Pros and Cons:  
  The subsidy system in Egypt includes the two types: in-kind system and the 
cash system. The in-kind system is represented by the BB subsidy, in which the 
subsidized bread is available to everyone, and the subsidized food commodities which 
are provided by a certain quota to the RC holders. The cash system is represented by 
the SA and scholarships provided to the target group which includes those households 
(individuals) who have no sources of income. Each of the two systems has its pros and 
cons to the recipients, who are supposedly the poor and the low-income Egyptians, and 
to the providers which in our case is the Government represented by the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity (MOSS), and the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s). 
  For the subsidy recipients, the cash system gives them the freedom to buy 
whatever they want of goods and services, with the quantity they want of each, given 
the price(s) of these commodities and services and the subsidy amount. Thus, given a 
set amount of cash subsidy, the higher are the prices, the smaller will be the amount 
bought of the commodities (and services), no matter how basic are some of those 
commodities to the individuals’ life. On the other hand, the in-kind subsidy does not 
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give the beneficiaries any freedom of choice. They have to buy the subsidized 
commodities with the assigned amounts at the assigned prices. In other words, the in-
kind subsidy guarantees the necessary commodities amount at low subsidized prices, 
but, it does not give any freedom of choice to the beneficiaries to choose among the 
available commodities in the market. As a subsidy beneficiary, choosing between the 
two kinds of subsidy systems with respect to basic commodities is equivalent to 
choosing between having freedom of choice of what to buy, but always being insecure 
regarding the quantity he/she can buy given price changes, or choosing to guarantee a 
certain amount of basic commodities at affordable controlled prices, but while being 
deprived of the freedom of choice for what to buy.  
 For the subsidy providers (governments and NGOs), the important question 
they face when applying any of the two types of subsidy systems is how to target those 
eligible to the subsidy. The waste in the subsidy that may exist, and the amount of the 
inclusion error involved, does not depend on whether the subsidy type chosen  is cash 
or in-kind, but it depends mainly on the targeting mechanism applied. The choice of 
the appropriate system among the two subsidy types depends on four factors: the 
characteristics of the target group, the objective of the subsidy system, the economic 
status of the subsidy provider (which can be the government or the NGO), and the 
functioning of the market economy. 
 (1) The Characteristics of the Target Group: The economic and social 
characteristics of the target group are important factors in the choice between an in-
kind and cash subsidy. What should be considered is whether the target group 
members are living in absolute or relative poverty. Living in absolute poverty, i.e. 
living at, or below, the absolute poverty line, means that they cannot afford to buy the 
necessary food commodities. On the other hand, living in relative poverty means that 
they are living at a relatively low income as compared to the average per capita income 
in the country, but that their income is sufficient to meet their basic needs (i.e., living 
above the absolute poverty line). A good example of that is the case of Bahrain and the 
other Gulf countries
25
. For those living in relative poverty, cash subsidy would be a 
good choice. But for those living in absolute poverty, in-kind subsidy provides a more 
appropriate safety net for them. 
                                                 
25
 For example, poor Bahraini women are defined as those living at relative poverty line. Many of poor 
Bahrainis have cars and their homes are equipped with fridges, stoves, etc. of modern electrical 
appliances (Korayem, 2007). 
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 (2) The Objective of the Subsidy System: This objective can be a specific target, like 
providing necessary food commodities to the target group to protect them from hunger 
and malnutrition. In this case, the in-kind subsidy will be the best choice, since giving 
them a cash subsidy does not guarantee the realization of the specific objective aimed 
at by the subsidy
26
. But, if the objective is to raise the relative standard of living of the 
target group that lives in relative, and not absolute, poverty and, hence, their incomes 
satisfy already their basic needs, cash subsidy will be the best choice.  
(3) The Economic Status of the Government as a Subsidy Provider: The 
purchasing power of the cash subsidy depends on the amount of subsidy and the price 
level. To keep a constant level of purchasing power to the recipients, cash subsidy has 
to be increased at the same pace as the rise in market prices. Since prices are usually 
increasing with time, especially if the market is malfunctioning, cash subsidy has to be 
increased annually with at the same percentage of the inflation rate. This can be 
achieved only in the economically advanced countries (like the developed countries) 
and rich economies, (like the Gulf countries) because of the availability of resources 
which they can depend on. In countries with poor or average economic resources, this 
cannot be realized; the increase in cash subsidy will always lag behind the inflation 
rate, making subsidy beneficiaries suffer from the increasing cost of living and the 
non-satisfaction of basic needs. In this case, it is for the benefit of the subsidy 
recipients to get subsidy in-kind and be deprived from having freedom of choice in the 
market, than having cash subsidy with freedom of choice regarding commodities, but 
with deteriorating standard of living and deprivation from satisfying their basic needs. 
(4) The Functioning Pattern of the Market Economy: The market economy consists 
of three players, and to run efficiently the power of these players should be kept in 
balance. The first player is the producers and traders who own the capital and the 
power of hiring and firing and, hence, this player is the strongest one in the market. 
The second player consists of the workers who have their labor to offer. This player 
could be strong, if the supply of labor is organized under one entity, like labor unions, 
which coordinate their labor supply vis-à-vis the producers. On the other hand, labor 
can be weak and fragile, if each worker supplies his labor on his own, which is the 
case when labor unions or similar organizations are missing. The third player in the 
market is the consumers, who can be strong with their purchasing power, if they find 
                                                 
26
 “Virtually every study” on food stamps in the USA finds that “stamps increase household nutrition 
availability at “2 to 10 times the rate of a like value of cash income” (Barrett, 2002, as quoted in 
Gentilini, 2007; 7).  
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the organization(s), like consumer protection organizations, that protect their rights to 
get their money’s worth and support them against market cheating and exploitation. 
On the other hand they can be weak and exploited if they do not find this umbrella 
protection, and must accept to buy whatever is available in the market to meet their 
needs, no matter how bad are the quality of the supplied commodities and how 
unreasonably high the prices are. Thus, in normal economic conditions, the 
functioning of the market economy will be successful and efficient only if there is a 
balance of power between the three players. This can be achieved by issuing laws and 
regulations that reduce the power of the first player (capital owners), like issuing strict 
monopoly laws that punish heavily non-competitive behavior in the market, and laws 
that increase the power of the two other players (labor and consumers), by allowing 
and encouraging the establishment of strong labor unions and consumer agencies. In 
this way, prices will be kept under control, the welfare of the three groups - producers, 
workers and consumers - can be maximized together, the economy will grow, and 
economic and social discrepancy between the populations will be kept within an 
acceptable level. 
According to the factors above, which are supposed to guide the choice 
between subsidies in cash or in-kind, what is the appropriate type of food subsidy for 
Egypt? For the first factor, the characteristics of the target group, the members of this 
group in Egypt are the poor who are living at the absolute poverty line or below, and 
the low-income people who are just living above the poverty line. Regarding the 
second factor, the objective of the food subsidy system (BB and RC) is to guarantee a 
minimum standard of living for the poor and the low-income people, by providing 
them with the necessary food commodities at affordable prices to their low income 
level. Those who do not have a source of income, cash subsidy in the form of SA are 
provided to them by MOSS, together with the in-kind food subsidy (BB and RC 
commodities). Considering the third factor, Egypt is not a rich country in terms of 
resource endowments; however, it cannot be seen as a poor country either. But with 
the present status of the resources that the country has and the mismanagement of 
those resources, the GoE is suffering from a budget deficit which has been increasing 
over time. This means that, given the available resources and the prevailing budget 
deficit, the GoE is not capable of increasing cash subsidy, if applied, at the same pace 
as the increase in prices. For the fourth factor, the functioning of the market economy 
in Egypt is not as efficient as it should be. This is because the laws and regulations that 
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balance the power between the three players in the market are either missing or weak. 
The current monopoly law is weak and defective, leaving the market economic power 
mainly with the producers vis-à-vis the workers and consumers. Labor unions are 
limited to public enterprises’ workers, who are supposedly much less exposed to 
exploitation as compared to the workers in the private sector. Also, the existing 
consumer protection agencies are not effective enough to enhance the power of the 
consumers vis-à-vis the producers and the traders.  
One outcome of this unbalanced power between the three market players is the 
rise in prices over time, especially the prices of food, which most of the budget of the 
poor and the low-income people is spent on. Even with the low yearly inflation rate 
estimated and published by the government in the period before the financial crisis, 
the average annual consumer price index of food, beverages and tobacco (CPI, food) 
increased by 9.1% from year 2000 to 2005 at 1999/2000 prices
27
 (Ministry of Planning 
and CAPMAS, 2005), and by 19.5% over the two years 2006/07-2008/09 at 2007 
prices
28
. Given that the budget deficit in Egypt has been considerably increased after 
the international food crisis in 2007 and the international financial crisis in 2008, one 
could not expect that the BB and RC subsidies, if they were in cash, would have 
increased by the same percentage as the increase in food prices during 1999/2000 –
2008/09. The lag of cash subsidy behind the food price increase would have meant the 
increase in poverty and the deterioration of the standard of living of the poor and low-
income people in Egypt, with all what this might entail of negative political and 
economic consequences in society.  
The assumption of the expected lag between cash subsidy and prices in Egypt 
can be substantiated by comparing the increase in the cash SA and the increase in 
prices over the mentioned period. The average monthly SA increased from LE 36 in 
1999/2000 (Korayem, 2002) to LE 83.3 in 2008/09 (Table 6), which means an average 
annual increase of 5.3% over nine years period. This is much less than the average 
annual increase of food prices over the period (9.1% for the period 2000-2005 and 
19.5% for 2006/07-2008/09), which means a fall in the real value of the SA and, 
hence, its purchasing power, despite having increased by 231.4% over the period 
1999/2000 – 2008/09. 
                                                 
27
 (( CPI, food) in 2005 (146.8) -  ( CPI, food) in 2000 (101.5)) / 5= 9.1; 1999/2000= 100 (data are taken 
from: www.msrintranet.capmas.gov.eg/pls/social(pric_all) 
28
( ( CPI, food) in 2008/09 (138.1) - ( CPI, food) in 2006/07(99.1)) /2 = 19.5; 2007 = 100 (the same data 
source as the previous footnote).  
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One may conclude that the change of the in-kind subsidy of BB and RC 
commodities to cash subsidy is not an appropriate choice if the objective of the GoE is 
to guarantee the basic needs for the poor and the low-income people in Egypt, as long 
as the market is malfunctioning and the cash subsidy cannot be adjusted annually by 
the government according to price increases coming from the increasing budget deficit 
over time.  
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Annex I 
Annex (I.A) 
Elasticity of the Demand Function for 
Baladi Bread, Edible Oil, Sugar, Rice, and Tea 
The demand functions of the above-mentioned commodities have been 
estimated using cross-section expenditure data in the Household Income, Expenditure, 
and Consumption Survey (HIECS) 2004/05. We applied the weighted least square 
(WLS) technique to take into consideration the relative share of the sample households 
in the different expenditure intervals. Five typical specifications have been tried in this 
regard; all of them are based on the Keynesian approach that views current 
consumption as a function of current income rather than permanent income as stated 
by Milton Friedman. The five forms of the demand function are the linear form, the 
semi-log and log-log forms, the log reciprocal form, and the double-log reciprocal 
form. The five forms are: 
jij bYaX    (1) 
jij YbaX loglog   (2) 
jij YbaX log  (3) 
jij YbaX /log   (4) 
jjij YcYbaX log/log   (5) 
Where ijX  refers to the average expenditure of the household in the j
th
 expenditure 
interval on the i
th
 commodity, and jY  refers to total expenditure per typical household 
in the j
th
 expenditure interval. Having tried the 5 specifications, the Log-Log form 
(equation 2) gave the best fit of the demand functions for the five items. The estimated 
demand functions are
29
:   
- Urban 
TCEbread log852.0715.3log   (2-1U) 
                                                 (1.230)   (0.202)    470.02 R  
 
                                                 
29 The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. 
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TCEOil log795.0993.4log   (2-2U) 
                                              (1.242)   (0.204)    428.02 R
 
TCERice log783.0540.5log   (2-3U) 
                                               (1.311)   (0.215)     392.02 R
 
TCESugar log793.0904.5log   (2-4U) 
                                                 (1.222)   (0.200)     436.02 R  
TCETea log773.0901.5log   (2-5U) 
                                               (1.341)   (0.220)     375.02 R
 
- Rural 
TCEbread log443.0702.1log   (2-1R) 
                                              (0.564)   (0.080)    619.02 R  
TCEOil log663.0*866.0log   (2-2R) 
                                              (0.561)   (0.081)   794.02 R
 
TCERice log801.0274.2log   (2-3R) 
                                               (0.364)   (0.053)   931.02 R
 
TCESugar log649.0624.1log   (2-4R) 
                                                  (0.473)  (0.068)   839.02 R  
TCETea log538.0*90.0log   (2-5R) 
                                             (0.511)   (0.074)   753.02 R  
 
 
 
Note = * denotes insignificance at 5% error level. 
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Annex I.B 
Table (1.B-1): Average Expenditure on the Subsidized Food Items Per Urban Household  in 2004/05 (L.E.) 
HE Interval # of Households Weights
30
 Baladi Bread Edible Oil  Rice Sugar Tea 
Food & Beverage 
Expenditure 
Total 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
Less than 2000 75 0.341 49.3 13.5 7.6 5.2 4.9 1082.4 1511.7 
2000- 206 0.937 68.2 16.3 9.8 6.6 6.7 1457.9 2542.5 
3000- 461 2.096 100.9 23.4 13.2 9 9.3 1935.7 3509.3 
4000- 718 3.264 112.1 20.8 12.9 9.1 9.1 2362 4471.3 
5000- 1156 5.256 134 25.1 14.5 10.2 10 2827.6 5460.8 
6000- 1483 6.742 150.7 26.2 15.2 10.5 10 3209.6 6440.5 
7000- 1695 7.706 168.4 31 17.1 11.9 11.7 3663.3 7412.6 
8000- 1907 8.670 176.5 32 17.7 12.5 12.1 4122.3 8401.2 
9000- 1822 8.284 178.8 33.7 18.9 13.1 12.3 4481.3 9362.9 
10000 2437 11.080 191.6 36.5 20 14.3 13.5 4957.2 10583 
11500- 1941 8.825 196.7 36.9 20.6 14.8 14 5522.5 12028 
13000- 2045 9.298 196.4 40.6 22.3 16.3 14.8 6111.7 13694 
15000- 1442 6.556 203.8 43.4 22.8 16.5 15.4 6800.2 15654 
17000- 1428 6.492 197.4 39.1 21.4 15.6 13.7 7424.1 17969 
20000- 1261 5.733 189 38 20.1 14.9 12.4 8359.3 21575 
25000- 670 3.046 176 33.2 17.5 12.7 10.9 9582.1 26541 
30000- 942 4.283 116.2 22.5 11.5 8.9 7 11017.3 36236 
50000- 220 1.000 60.5 9.2 4.2 4.1 2.5 13763 57648 
75000- 48 0.218 84.2 15.3 5.3 5.5 4.4 17010.7 80674 
100000+ 37 0.168 36.8 8.7 5.2 4 2.7 21765.4 114366 
Total 21995 100 171.9 33.2 18.3 13.1 12.1 5498.3 13289 
 
                                                 
30 Calculated as the number of households in each expenditure bracket to total number of households.  
Source: The first two columns and the last two ones are taken from CAPMAS, HIECS 2004/05, Vol.4, table 11-1, p. 40, while the middle 5 columns (expenditure on the 5 
subsidized commodities) are taken fromCAPMAS, unpublished data. 
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Table (1.B-2): Average Expenditure on the Subsidized Food Items Per Rural Household  in 2004/05 (L.E.) 
HE Interval # of Households Weights
31
 Baladi Bread Edible Oil  Rice Sugar Tea 
Food & Beverage 
Expenditure 
Total 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
Less than 2000 207 0.825 46.4 15.7 10.3 6.9 7.4 1059.8 1562.5 
2000- 494 1.968 62.8 19 12.4 8.5 9.1 1451.9 2530.5 
3000- 980 3.904 72.7 19.7 12.3 8.9 9.1 1998.7 3504.8 
4000- 1644 6.550 88.6 23 15 10.5 10.7 2457.4 4478.5 
5000- 2330 9.283 104.3 26.2 16 11.1 11.4 2937.1 5449.5 
6000- 2787 11.104 112.9 30.3 18.2 12.9 13 3411.8 6414.8 
7000- 2949 11.749 118.6 36.1 20.9 14.6 14.8 3907.9 7391.3 
8000- 2792 11.124 121.3 40.5 23.3 16.8 16.7 4396.3 8356.9 
9000- 2390 9.522 125.6 46.1 25.8 18.8 18.4 4816.3 9333.9 
10000 2869 11.430 134.8 51.6 29.5 20.7 20.2 5397.6 10519 
11500- 1982 7.896 133.7 56.8 30.7 23.3 21.8 6086.3 11964 
13000- 1600 6.375 145.9 61.5 33.9 25.7 23.9 6778 13597 
15000- 825 3.287 151.4 65.4 34.5 26.8 24.7 7508.2 15498 
17000- 643 2.562 169.6 67.9 35.3 28.3 25.6 8180.1 17622 
20000- 379 1.510 178.2 67.8 34.2 29.4 26.8 9102.4 20995 
25000- 129 0.514 170.6 66.7 32.4 26.9 25.1 10339.6 24865 
30000- 82 0.327 183.9 46.6 55.8 22.8 21 10324.4 29863 
50000- 15 0.060 77.4 58 88.8 24.8 18.6 16079.5 48270 
75000- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
100000+ 2 0.008 284.6 0 0 0 0 35984.7 115632 
Total 25100 100 120.7 41.4 23.7 17.2 16.8 4557.5 8953.3 
                                                 
31 Calculated as the number of households in each expenditure bracket to total number of households.  
Source: The first two columns and the last two ones are taken from CAPMAS, HIECS 2004/05, Vol.4, table 11-2, p. 44, while the middle 5 columns (expenditure on the 5 
subsidized commodities) are taken from CAPMAS, unpublished data. 
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 (1.B-3) 
 Price Elasticity in Urban Areas, 2004-05 
H.E. Interval Bread Edible oil Sugar Rice Tea 
Less than 2000 
-0.0388 -0.0099 -0.0056 -0.0038 -0.0035 
2000- 
-0.0399 -0.0089 -0.0053 -0.0035 -0.0036 
3000- 
-0.0444 -0.0096 -0.0054 -0.0036 -0.0037 
4000- 
-0.0405 -0.0070 -0.0044 -0.0031 -0.0030 
5000- 
-0.0404 -0.0071 -0.0040 -0.0028 -0.0027 
6000- 
-0.0400 -0.0065 -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0024 
7000- 
-0.0392 -0.0068 -0.0037 -0.0025 -0.0025 
8000- 
-0.0365 -0.0062 -0.0034 -0.0023 -0.0022 
9000- 
-0.0340 -0.0060 -0.0033 -0.0023 -0.0021 
10000 
-0.0330 -0.0059 -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0021 
11500- 
-0.0303 -0.0053 -0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0019 
13000- 
-0.0273 -0.0052 -0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0019 
15000- 
-0.0256 -0.0051 -0.0027 -0.0019 -0.0018 
17000- 
-0.0227 -0.0042 -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0014 
20000- 
-0.0193 -0.0036 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0012 
25000- 
-0.0157 -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0009 
30000- 
-0.0089 -0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0005 
50000- 
-0.0037 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
75000- 
-0.0042 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
100000+ 
-0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
Source: Calculated using equation  2 in the text and data from tables (1.B-1) and (1.B-5) in Annex 1.B.  
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Table (1.B-4) 
 Price Elasticity in Rural Areas, 2004-05 
H.E. Interval Bread Edible oil Sugar Rice Tea 
Less than 
2000 
-0.0194 -0.0098 -0.0063 -0.0052 -0.0038 
2000- 
-0.0192 -0.0087 -0.0055 -0.0047 -0.0034 
3000- 
-0.0161 -0.0066 -0.0040 -0.0036 -0.0025 
4000- 
-0.0160 -0.0062 -0.0040 -0.0034 -0.0024 
5000- 
-0.0157 -0.0059 -0.0035 -0.0030 -0.0021 
6000- 
-0.0147 -0.0059 -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0020 
7000- 
-0.0134 -0.0061 -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0020 
8000- 
-0.0122 -0.0061 -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0020 
9000- 
-0.0116 -0.0064 -0.0035 -0.0031 -0.0020 
10000 
-0.0111 -0.0064 -0.0036 -0.0030 -0.0020 
11500- 
-0.0097 -0.0062 -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0019 
13000- 
-0.0095 -0.0060 -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0019 
15000- 
-0.0089 -0.0058 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0018 
17000- 
-0.0092 -0.0055 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0017 
20000- 
-0.0087 -0.0049 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0016 
25000- 
-0.0073 -0.0043 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0013 
30000- 
-0.0079 -0.0030 -0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0011 
50000- 
-0.0021 -0.0024 -0.0036 -0.0012 -0.0006 
100000+ 
-0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: Calculated using equation 2 in the text and data from tables (1.B-2) and (1.B-6) in Annex 1.B. 
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Table (1.B-5)  
Ratio of Expenditure on Subsidized Items to Food Expenditure per Urban Household 2004-5 (%) 
H.E. Interval 
# of 
Households 
Bread Edible oil Rice Sugar Tea 
Less than 2000 75 4.55 1.25 0.70 0.48 0.45 
2000- 206 4.68 1.12 0.67 0.45 0.46 
3000- 461 5.21 1.21 0.68 0.46 0.48 
4000- 718 4.75 0.88 0.55 0.39 0.39 
5000- 1156 4.74 0.89 0.51 0.36 0.35 
6000- 1483 4.70 0.82 0.47 0.33 0.31 
7000- 1695 4.60 0.85 0.47 0.32 0.32 
8000- 1907 4.28 0.78 0.43 0.30 0.29 
9000- 1822 3.99 0.75 0.42 0.29 0.27 
10000 2437 3.87 0.74 0.40 0.29 0.27 
11500- 1941 3.56 0.67 0.37 0.27 0.25 
13000- 2045 3.21 0.66 0.36 0.27 0.24 
15000- 1442 3.00 0.64 0.34 0.24 0.23 
17000- 1428 2.66 0.53 0.29 0.21 0.18 
20000- 1261 2.26 0.45 0.24 0.18 0.15 
25000- 670 1.84 0.35 0.18 0.13 0.11 
30000- 942 1.05 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.06 
50000- 220 0.44 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 
75000- 48 0.49 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 
100000+ 37 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Source: Calculated from Table 1.B-1 in Annex 1.B.  
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Table (1.B-6) 
Ratio of Expenditure on Subsidized Items to Food Expenditure 
 Per Rural Household 2004-05 (%) 
HE Interval 
 
Relative Share 
of Households 
Bread Edible oil Rice Sugar Tea 
Less than 2000 207 
4.38 1.48 0.97 0.65 0.70 
2000- 494 
4.33 1.31 0.85 0.59 0.63 
3000- 980 
3.64 0.99 0.62 0.45 0.46 
4000- 1644 
3.61 0.94 0.61 0.43 0.44 
5000- 2330 
3.55 0.89 0.54 0.38 0.39 
6000- 2787 
3.31 0.89 0.53 0.38 0.38 
7000- 2949 
3.03 0.92 0.53 0.37 0.38 
8000- 2792 
2.76 0.92 0.53 0.38 0.38 
9000- 2390 
2.61 0.96 0.54 0.39 0.38 
10000 2869 
2.50 0.96 0.55 0.38 0.37 
11500- 1982 
2.20 0.93 0.50 0.38 0.36 
13000- 1600 
2.15 0.91 0.50 0.38 0.35 
15000- 825 
2.02 0.87 0.46 0.36 0.33 
17000- 643 
2.07 0.83 0.43 0.35 0.31 
20000- 379 
1.96 0.74 0.38 0.32 0.29 
25000- 129 
1.65 0.65 0.31 0.26 0.24 
30000- 82 
1.78 0.45 0.54 0.22 0.20 
50000- 15 
0.48 0.36 0.55 0.15 0.12 
100000+ 2 
0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Calculated from Table 1.B-2 in Annex 1.B. 
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Table (1.B-7) 
Total Number of Population, Poor, Ration Cards, Beneficiaries, and Bakeries, by Region 
Governorates  
Population 
(thousands), 2006 
(1) 
Poor Persons 
(thousands), 
2004/05 (2) 
No. of Ration 
Cards, 2008 
(3) 
 
No. of 
Beneficiaries, 2008 
(3) 
# of Bakeries, 
2008 (3) 
Allocations of 
82% 
Extracted 
Wheat Flour 
(ton) 
Cairo 6759 356.4 1089788 5527200 66518.3 73087.98 
Alexandria 4124 306.8 568478 3224033 36683 40868.64 
Port Said 571 41 95791 414371 4459.35 5077.70 
Suez 512 11.8 82521 399469 4831.47 5027.47 
Urban Govs 11966 716 1836578 9565073 112492 124061.79 
Damietta 1097 28.2 231289 1012398 8110.72 9196.89 
Dakahlia 4990 346.7 995398 4675891 29870.2 30795.58 
Sharkia 5354 1440 860572 4636302 34816.4 34913.99 
Kalyoubia 4252 435.6 569254 3105460 31055 31528.29 
kafr el- sheikh 2620 341.8 517032 2573630 15554.7 15832.61 
Gharbia 4011 238.9 813887 3864412 25698.1 26382.49 
Menoufia 3271 564.4 612914 2997634 22518 22889.69 
Beheira 4747 960.7 852102 4421953 27874.3 30124.19 
Ismailia 953 55.2 135303 770504 7921.55 8221.65 
Lower Egypt 31295 4411.5 5587751 28058184 203419 209885.38 
Giza 3143 737.7 376826 2083772 25816.9 26904.8 
Beni suef 2292 1024.5 356881 2108134 18256.9 18402.57 
Fayoum 2511 290.7 457564 2387513 15718.1 22813.13 
Menia 4166 1595.2 631461 3971999 32884.8 33882.73 
Assyout 3445 2072.5 484036 3190831 24360.1 29244.74 
Sohag 3747 1551 546298 3501517 16838.8 33686.51 
Qena 3002 988.6 487533 2850114 9195.63 26477.61 
Luxor 457 25.5 79613 438052 2949.65 5815.68 
Aswan 1187 268.2 222233 1125066 7118.43 14383.55 
Upper Egypt 23950 8553.9 3642445 21656998 153139 211611.32 
Red Sea 289 .. 27597 133291 2050.65 2588.2 
New valley 187 .. 40176 166310 1483.39 1890.26 
Matrouh 323 .. 34338 252519 2253.7 4419.17 
North Sinai 344 .. 51708 288395 2159.15 4919.32 
South Sinai 150 .. 6891 39174 847.85 1382.7 
Frontier Govs 1293   160710 879689 8794.74 15199.65 
Helwan 1713 .. 228804 1209152 13119.3 18202.67 
6 of october 2581 .. 329532 1741992 13729.9 18756.45 
Total 72798 13974.1 11785820 63111088 504694 597717.26 
Source: (1) CAPMAS, 2008, pp. 3- , (2) INP and UNDP 2008, p. 277, (3) MOSS, 2009, p.14 
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Table 1.B-8 
Percentage Distribution of Population, Poor, Ration Cards, Beneficiaries, BB Bakeries, and Wheat Flour (82 percent 
Extraction), by Region (%) 
Governorates  Population  2006  
Poor Persons  
2004/05 
Ration 
Cards 2008  
 
Beneficiaries, 2008  
BB Bakeries, 
2008 
82% Extracted 
Wheat Flour  
Cairo 9.28 2.55 9.25 8.76 13.18 12.23 
Alexandria 5.66 2.20 4.82 5.11 7.27 6.83 
Port Said 0.78 0.29 0.81 0.66 0.88 0.85 
Suez 0.70 0.08 0.70 0.63 0.96 0.84 
Urban Govs 16.44 5.12 15.58 15.16 22.29 20.75 
Damietta 1.51 0.20 1.96 1.60 1.61 1.55 
Dakahlia 6.85 2.48 8.45 7.41 5.92 5.17 
Sharkia 7.35 10.30 7.30 7.35 6.90 5.85 
Kalyoubia 5.84 3.12 4.83 4.92 6.15 5.27 
Kafr el- sheikh 3.60 2.45 4.39 4.08 3.08 2.65 
Gharbia 5.51 1.71 6.91 6.12 5.09 4.41 
Menoufia 4.49 4.04 5.20 4.75 4.46 3.83 
Beheira 6.52 6.87 7.23 7.01 5.52 5.04 
Ismailia 1.31 0.40 1.15 1.22 1.57 1.37 
Lower Egypt 42.99 31.57 47.41 44.46 40.31 35.14 
Giza 4.32 5.28 3.20 3.30 5.12 4.5 
Beni suef 3.15 7.33 3.03 3.34 3.62 3.08 
Fayoum 3.45 2.08 3.88 3.78 3.11 3.81 
Menia 5.72 11.42 5.36 6.29 6.52 5.67 
Assyout 4.73 14.83 4.11 5.06 4.83 4.89 
Sohag 5.15 11.10 4.64 5.55 3.34 5.63 
Qena 4.12 7.07 4.14 4.52 1.82 4.43 
Luxor 0.63 0.18 0.68 0.69 0.58 0.97 
Aswan 1.63 1.92 1.89 1.78 1.41 2.41 
Upper Egypt 32.90 61.21 30.91 34.32 30.34 35.39 
Red Sea 0.40   0.23 0.21 0.41 0.43 
New valley 0.26   0.34 0.26 0.29 0.32 
Matrouh 0.44   0.29 0.40 0.45 0.74 
North sinai 0.47   0.44 0.46 0.43 0.82 
South sinai 0.21   0.06 0.06 0.17 0.23 
Frontier Govs 1.78   1.36 1.39 1.74 2.54 
Helwan 2.35   1.94 1.92 2.60 3.04 
6 of october 3.55   2.80 2.76 2.72 3.14 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from Table 1.B-7 in Annex 1.B 
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Annex I.C., Table (1.C-1), Monthly Social Assistance in 7 Governorates(1) 
(Ordered by Poverty Ratio), In 2007/2008 & 2008/2009 
Social Assist 
Per Govern. 
Population 
(2006) 
(Thous.) 
(1) 
 
Number 
of  Poor 
2004/05 
(Thous.) 
(2) 
Poverty 
Ratio 
 (%) 
 
(3) 
(2 / 1) 
2007/08 2008/09 Ratio of 
Recipients 
to the Poor 
2007/08 
(%) 
(10) 
(4 /2) 
 
 
 
Ratio of 
Recipients 
to the Poor  
2008/09 
(%) 
(11) 
(7/2) 
No. of 
Recipients 
(4) 
Aver. 
Month. 
Assist.(LE) 
(5) 
(6/4)/12 
Total 
Annual 
Assist.(LE 
thous.) 
(6) 
 
No. of 
Recipients 
 
(7) 
 
 
Aver. Month. 
Assist. (LE) 
(8) 
(9/7)/12 
Total 
Annual 
Assist.(LE 
thous.) 
(9) 
1.Assiut: 3445 2072.5 60.2         
A.Pension 
Plan 
   48673 77.7 45402.2 59504 83.7 59765.0 2.3 2.9 
B.Monthly 
Assistance 
Plan 
   3508 67.1 2824.5 4811 86.8 5009.3 0.2 0.2 
C.Child 
Pension 
   4200 13.2 667.0 2628 28.9 912.6 0.2 0.1 
2.Sohag: 
 
3747 1551 41.4         
A.Pension 
Plan 
   44487 82.7 44132.6 50592 86.3 52410.5 2.9 3.3 
B.Monthly 
Assisistance 
Plan 
   3918 71.1 3343.8 6241 78.7 5894.4 0.3 0.4 
C.Child 
Pension 
   711 67.5 575.9 787 71.0 671.2 0.05 0.05 
3.Minya: 
 
4166 1595.2 38.3         
A.Pension 
Plan 
   58396 84.3 59075.4 82784 89.8 89298.5 3.7 5.2 
B.Monthly 
Assisistance 
Plan 
   10751 21.2 2731.4 5250 71.5 4503.5 0.7 0.3 
C.Child 
Pension 
   5328 17.8 1140.5 2681 48.0 1544.5 0.3 0.2 
4.Mersa-
Matruh 
323 -- --         
A.Pension 
Plan 
   8938 84.9 9106.9 9656 92.1 10675.3 -- -- 
B.Monthly 
Assisistance 
Plan 
   796 71.4 681.6 34 10.1 4.1 -- -- 
C.Child 
Pension 
   248 64.3 191.3 269 69.1 223.0 -- -- 
5.Sharkia: 5354 1440 26.9         
A.Pension 
Plan 
   62917 79.5 59995.3 71774 85.6 73700.8 4.4 5.0 
B.Monthly 
Assisistance 
Plan 
   3277 61.8 2429.2 5715 76.3 5236.0 0.2 0.4 
C.Child 
Pension 
   2561 58.0 1782.9 2993 65.4 2351.4 0.2 0.2 
6.Kafr-El-
Sheikh: 
2620 341.8 13.0         
A.Pension 
Plan 
   33288 75.0 29957.0 38071 74.1 33831.0 9.7 11.1 
B.Monthly 
Assisistance 
Plan 
   1522 70.6 1290.3 2428 66.3 1933.0 0.4 0.7 
C.Child 
Pension 
   2231 39.9 1069.3 2377 46.7 1330.8 0.7 0.7 
7.Cairo: 6759 356.4 5.3         
A.Pension 
Plan 
   71343 84.7 72539.8 75552 92.6 83981.5 20.0 21.2 
B.Monthly 
Assisistance 
Plan 
   3500 82.1 3450.2 4925 83.8 4952.5 1.0 1.4 
C.Child 
Pension 
   5572 40.9 2736.0 6143 45.2 3333.3 1.6 1.7 
 
(1) Those are the seven Governorates where field work has been conducted for the purpose of this study. 
Source: Columns 1 & 2 are taken from CAPMAS & Egypt, Human Development Report, 2008 as cited in: El-Araby, 2010; Appendix D, Table D1. Columns 4, 6, 7 & 9 are taken from the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity (MOSS), unpublished data. Columns 3, 5, 8, 10 & 11 are calculated from the Table data. 
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Acronyms 
 
BB: Baladi Bread 
CAPMAS: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
CDC: Cairo Demographic Center 
FGD: Focus Group Discussion 
HIECS: Households Income, Expenditure, and Consumption Survey 
GoE: Government of Egypt 
MOF: Ministry of Finance 
MOP: Ministry of Planning (Economic Development) 
MOSS: Ministry of Social Solidarity 
RC: Ration Card 
SA: Social Assistance 
SAP: Social Assistance Program 
WB: World Bank 
WFP: World Food Program 
 
